Yes, Marty, there is a way the US can help the Iranian reform movement. There are several ways, in fact.

1. Stop the talk of invading Iran. War has a way of helping dictatorships, solidifying the lumpen behind fascist leaders, and killing any idea of reform pending the removal of the threat. This is not a new idea; Orwell said it best in 1984 and the principle still applies.

2. Not making physical, military threats against Iran is not the same thing as not applying pressure. Pressure, there must be; but at the same time, pressure of the right kind. Excluding Iranian students from US schools (as is being proposed), clubbing or tasering them (as was done in UCLA), or harassing the Iranian middle class travelling to the US to connect with family is not the way to go. As you would have noticed, Iran was the only Muslim country in which there were spontaneous candle-light vigils after 9/11; the Iranian people is probably the most sympathetic to US and Western interests of any Muslim country. Cultivate the people; harass the leaders.

3. Don't propose to provide financial support to Iranian “opposition groups” in the diaspora. Dollars issued by Congress to topple an elected (however imperfectly) Iranian government reminds everyone of the CIA's role in the topplying of Mosaddegh, the last democratic prime minister of Imperial Iran (who was in some respects highly pro-American, in fact). The opposition in diaspora has about as much credibility in Iran as Chalabi had in Iraq. Instead, ensure more regular cultural exchanges; beam cultural programmes and sound, unbiased political analysis and reporting into Iran via satellite; “support” reforms by spreading reformist ideas and not supporting allegedly reformist has-been politicians.

4. Stop coddling the MKO. This the Mujahedin-e Khalgh Organization. They were the armed wing of the revolution and complicit in the early wave of executions after the revolution. Before the revolution they were trained by Arafat; after the revolution, they were terrorists (both in power and out); in the Iran-Iraq war, they sided with Saddam; in Iraq they helped Saddam kill Kurds. True: many MKO operatives are fools, knaves and idealists; true: many MKO operatives have been tortured and executed. But the organisation itself is a terrorist cult and has no – I mean NO – credibility with any Iranian.

5. Stop coddling the MKO.

6. Stop coddling the MKO.

7. More Shiites have been killed at the hands of Sunnis than the other way around; more Americans have been killed at the hands of Sunnis than Shiites; Al Qaeda is a Sunni – extreme Sunni – organisation for whom Shiites are deadlier enemies than are “infidel” Americans. Stop worrying about a “shiite” revival or crescent in the region and start cultivating shiite clerics.

8. Abandon the idea of “axis of evil”. Better yet, accept that the whole idea of an “axis” between Khatami's Iran, Saddam's Iraq and Kim's Korea was daft, stupid, and the sickly brainchild of an ideologue with an overpowering imagination and an administration blinded by hubris.

Eat crow.

There was no axis; Khatami's Iran, for all its faults, was not “evil”; and neither then nor now did Iran have anything in common with Iraq or North Korea. (I mean, can you imagine a “student movement” under Saddam or Kim?) Once you have done that, then identify the REAL threats posed by the present Iranian administration and by the orientation of Iranian foreign policy, and try to address those on their own merits, rather than as part of an incongruous “axis”.

9. Last but not least, have a modicum of consistency in your foreign policy. Foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of small minds, I know, but no consistency at all is the bane of cynics, and cynics have no friends or allies. Pakistan is a nuclear power; it created and supported the Taliban; to this day it is not clear whether the ISI works with the US or with the enemies of the US; Musharraf came to power in a coup. And then there is Saudi Arabia with its Wahhabi leaders and the public beheadings. Egypt and its rigged elections. India and the nuclear agreement. And the MKO. The list goes on. Iran is dangerous and scary, but not as scary as Pakistan or the Saudis; it is far more democratic under any definition of the term than Egypt; and it is not yet, and will not be for the next five years, a nuclear power. Stop demonizing and start diplomacy.

That is – behave not like a drunken bully, but a responsible superpower. Then, and only then, you will be able to give life to the Iranian reform movement.

Cruise missiles could “help” like the Napalm “helped” in Vietnam, like Clinton's cruises in Sudan and Afghanistan “helped” avoid 9/11, like the cruises in Iraq helped against the civil war there.

What's really sad about these troglodyte attitudes is that it gives a terrible image to hawks and also to the military option; I mean, to say “lots of cruise missiles” when there has not even been a proper negotiation between Iran and the US, when no lines have been drawn, when no facts have been established, turns von Clausewitz on his head: war, in this scenario, is not “politics by other means”; it becomes the sole means and object of politics. Now, to be conceptually more militaristic than the Prussian war theorist is troubling, to say the least.

And, by the way, it's offhanded, idiotic comments like this that gives Americans such a bad image. If your answer to every problem is “more cruise missiles”, then don't kvetch when others consider other flying objects as missiles as well.

---

And to follow up on points raised in other comments:

Two critical points that we need to take into account in dealing with Iran.

First, despite its oil-wealth, thanks to Ahmadinejad's populist economic programme, the country is an economic basket-case (one half of Iran's oil revenue is spent subsidising basic staples such as bread; it spends up to $6 billion a year on IMPORTING gasoline; it is in dire need of basic foodstuffs; each year, 250,000 educated Iranians leave the country, etc.). The oil wealth is badly distributed. More important, the money is easily traceable to the handful of state-run foundations that are supervised by the President's paramilitary cronies. Trace the money; make public the transfers, the bribes, and the monopoly rents; and then go after the money through racketeering laws.

You don't really need to win, only to prosecute and harass the leadership, which is far more amenable to public pressure than anywhere else in the region other than Turkey (debatable) and Israel.

This is a basic Judo move of course: use the weight and momentum of your enemy to your advantage. In this instance, the Iranian people is the US' best ally against the Iranian government; use them, don't kill them or turn them against the US through ill-advised military action.

Second, of course all military action against Iran would be ill-advised right now.

We have been reminded of Iranian cruise missiles in the Persian Gulf; you might also bear in mind Iranian long-range missiles in Southern Lebanon. Shahab-3 missiles have a range of 2,000-2,500 km – from southern Lebanon, most of continental Europe would be brought under Iranian missile umbrella. There was considerable speculation that the long-range missiles were not used by Hezbollah in August because the Iranians held the switches … Iran could make trouble in Iraq; well, don't forget Afghanistan – Iran could easily make trouble for NATO there.

Would Iran start Armageddon? No. Even the Millenarian Ahmadinejad is not suicidal. Would the Iranian regime, however, sit back and take American cruise missiles (or tactical nukes, or bunker busters, or whatever else the silly ideologues and the small-willied missile-launchers would hurle at Iran) without responding, massively, and potentially indiscrimantely? Don't bet on it.

To advise caution is not to fear, and to remove the military option from the table is not to deny oneself the right to defend oneself if attacked. In any event, the United States and its allies are more than a match for Iran's military might, and the Iranians know it well. But we have to ask ourselves about the price of the means we choose to deploy, what objectives we seek, and whether the means are proportionate to the objectives. Unless and until Iran becomes a direct military threat – and it is far from that right now – there are far more effective ways of dealing with it than cruise missiles.